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“There’s no question about it. Wall Street got drunk.”1
—President George W. Bush 
 
 
There is a general consensus that the root cause of the most 
recent turmoil in the domestic and global financial markets was the 
failure to properly regulate mortgage lending and consumer debt.2
 
 1.  Andy Sullivan & Tabassum Zakaria, “Wall Street Got Drunk,” Bush 
at private event, REUTERS, July 23, 2008, http://uk.reuters.com/article/
idUKN2330503720080723.  
  
 2.  Timothy Geithner & Lawrence Summers, A New Financial Foundation, 
WASH. POST, June 15, 2009, at A15 (“This current financial crisis had many causes. 
It had its roots in the global imbalance in saving and consumption, in the 
2
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Regardless of whether the United States is now at the beginning, 
middle, or end of what some call the “Great Recession,” it is clear 
that there will be regulatory reform in response to this failure.  
Indeed, some reforms have already occurred.  Other reforms are 
being debated.  These initial reforms, however, have been largely 
structural.3
Part I of this article provides a brief history of the rise of the 
subprime and Alt-A mortgage industry, the economic and 
regulatory environment in which that rise occurred, and the 
disastrous consequences of failed government policies.  Part II 
analyzes the failure to properly oversee mortgage lending and the 
selling of mortgage backed securities through the lens of two 
economic concepts: asymmetrical information and game theory.  
Part III outlines Minnesota’s Anti-Predatory Lending Law, one of 
the toughest and most comprehensive mortgage lending statutes in 
the country, and discusses the first case brought under this law.  
Part IV concludes by analyzing how the Minnesota Anti-Predatory 
Lending Law could serve as a model for national regulatory reform. 
  The government still needs specific regulation of the 
day-to-day conduct of mortgage brokers and lenders. 
I. THE RISE OF SUBPRIME AND ALT-A MORTGAGES 
Creating a response to the foreclosure and economic crisis 
requires a clear understanding of how the crisis occurred.4  There 
are some who blame the Community Reinvestment Act.5
 
widespread use of poorly understood financial instruments, in shortsightedness 
and excessive leverage at financial institutions. But it was also the product of basic 
failures in financial supervision and regulation. Our framework for financial 
regulation is riddled with gaps, weaknesses and jurisdictional overlaps, and suffers 
from an outdated conception of financial risk.”).  
  The 
 3.  See U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: A NEW 
FOUNDATION, June 17, 2009, http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/regs/
FinalReport_web.pdf (proposing new financial regulatory structure and consumer 
protection agency). 
 4.  GEORGE SANTAYANA, THE LIFE OF REASON 82 (1905) (“Progress, far from 
consisting in change, depends on retentiveness. When change is absolute there 
remains no being to improve and no direction is set for possible improvement: 
and when experience is not retained, as among savages, infancy is perpetual. 
Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it. In the first 
stage of life the mind is frivolous and easily distracted, it misses progress by failing 
in consecutiveness and persistence. This is the condition of children and 
barbarians, in which instinct has learned nothing from experience.”). 
 5.  Michael Aleo & Pablo Svirsky, Foreclosure Fallout: The Banking Industry’s 
Attack on Disparate Impact Race Discrimination Claims Under the Fair Housing Act and 
the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 18 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 1, 10–11 (2008) 
3
Ireland: After the Storm: Asymmetrical Information, Game Theory, and an Ex
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2009
1. Ireland.doc 11/17/2009  7:02 PM 
4 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:1 
Community Reinvestment Act, aimed at preventing red-lining and 
reverse red-lining, prohibited federally insured banks and thrifts 
from limiting loans or prohibiting loans offered in certain 
neighborhoods.6  Critics of the Community Reinvestment Act argue 
that the government itself was to blame for the current economic 
crisis by forcing innocent lenders to originate loans to high-risk 
black and Hispanic borrowers.7  For example, Ann Coulter wrote 
an article titled, “They Gave your Mortgage to a Less Qualified 
Minority.”8  In her article, Ms. Coulter argues that the foreclosure 
and economic crisis was caused by “political correctness being 
forced on the mortgage lending industry in the Clinton era.”9  She 
then posits that banks were forced to ignore credit scores and lend 
based on “nontraditional measures of credit-worthiness, such as 
having a good jump shot or having a missing child named 
Caylee.”10
This theory, related to the Community Reinvestment Act, has 
largely, if not entirely, been de-bunked.
 
11  The most high-risk 
lending occurred through non-bank lenders that were not even 
covered by the Community Reinvestment Act.12  Some estimates are 
that three-quarters of the sub-prime loans that were originated by 
non-bank lenders during the real estate boom were not subject to 
the Community Reinvestment Act.13
Sub-Part A of this section posits that the root cause of the crisis 
was the regulatory structure itself, or lack thereof, and three critical 
decisions made by the government from 1999 to 2004 to weaken 
oversight of the financial services industry.  Sub-Part B of this 
section connects these three decisions to the sudden rise of sub-
prime and Alt-A loan, from less than 5% of all mortgage 
  This is, of course, assuming 
that the Act requires lenders to give loans to people who have good 
jump shots, which it does not. 
 
(summarizing and citing various commentaries blaming the Community 
Reinvestment Act for the foreclosure crisis). 
 6.  Id. at 11. 
 7.  Id. 
 8.  Id. (citing Ann Coulter, They Gave Your Mortgage to a Less Qualified 
Minority, HUMAN EVENTS ONLINE, Sept. 24, 2008, available at http:// 
www.humanevents.com/article.php?id=28714). 
 9.  Id. 
 10.  Id. 
 11. See id. at 12–14. 
 12.  Id. at 12. 
 13.  Id. at 13–14. 
4
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originations in 2000 to 40% of the mortgage market at the time of 
the crash. 
A.  The Regulatory Environment 
On January 23, 1996, President Clinton famously stated “The 
era of big government is over.”14  Then, arguably influenced by 
approximately $1 billion in bi-partisan campaign contributions 
from the financial services industry, Congress began systematically 
dismantling the regulation of lenders and financial institutions.15
1. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Services Modernization Act of 
1999 
  
First, Congress passed the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Services 
Modernization Act of 1999 (GLB), removing restrictions that 
prevented various financial services industries from merging, 
growing larger, and becoming too big to fail.  Second, Congress 
passed the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, 
removing the prohibition on unregulated derivatives or “side-bets” 
that stocks or other financial instruments are going to rise or fall.  
Third, Congress allowed the Securities and Exchange Commission 
to double the amount of debt that investment companies, like Bear 
Stearns and Lehman Brothers, were allowed to accrue.  Each of 
these actions created a regulatory environment that was ill-
equipped to manage billion-dollar companies that engage in risky 
behavior. 
On November 12, 1999, Congress passed GLB.16  GLB 
eliminated the depression-era regulations set forth in the Glass-
Steagall Act, which limited the permissible activities of a bank.  For 
example, a bank could not sell insurance or have subsidiaries that 
did nonbanking activities under the Glass-Steagall Act.17
 
 14.  President William Jefferson Clinton, State of the Union Address (Jan. 23, 
1996), available at http://stateoftheunionaddress.org/category/william-j-clinton 
/page/5. 
  With GLB, 
 15.  Center for Responsive Politics,  Finance, Insurance, Real Estate: Long 
Term Contribution Trends, http://www.opensecrets.org/industries/indus.php
?cycle=2010&ind=F (last visited August 18, 2009) (finding that the finance, 
insurance and real estate industries contributed over $2.2 billion from 1990 to 
2009, and approximately $1 billion from 1996 to 2004). 
 16.  Pub. L. No. 106, 102 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1811 (1999)).  
 17.  12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1994). See also Lissa L. Broome & Jerry W. 
Markham, Banking and Insurance: Before and After the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 25 J. 
5
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such restrictions were eliminated.  The only major requirement was 
that the activities were done under the umbrella of a “Financial 
Holding Company” and “complimentary” to the bank’s other 
activities.18
At its core, there were two fundamental flaws with GLB.  While 
sanctioning large, integrated financial, insurance, and investment 
businesses, the drafters failed to reform or modernize the oversight 
of these businesses.  GLB retained separate and distinct regulatory 
agencies across various industry segments.
 
19  None of these 
regulators had the resources, authority, or jurisdiction to handle a 
major economic crisis, as found in a report issued by the U.S. 
Government Accounting Office in 2004 (four years prior to the 
height of the current economic crisis).20  That report, in part, 
noted that the fractured regulatory system undermined the ability 
of the government to identify problems in their early stages.21
Not only did this fractured system allow predatory financial 
products to “fall through the cracks,” as stated by former Treasury 
Secretary Henry Paulson, it also created a dangerous environment 
wherein federal regulators competed with one another to be the 
regulator-of-choice for financial companies.
 
22  Federal regulators 
also deemphasized their role as consumer protection agencies and 
were arguably captured by the industries they regulated.23
 
CORP. L. 723, 755–765 (2000) (outlining the pre and post-GLB regulations, 
particularly as they relate to insurance). 
  
 18.  Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 103(c)(1)(b), 12 U.S.C. § 1841(p) (1999) 
(creating a Financial Holding Company); Id. § 103(a), 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k) (1999) 
(outlining permissible nonbanking activities). 
 19.  Eamonn K. Moran, Wall Street Meets Main Street: Understanding the Financial 
Crisis, 13 N.C. BANKING INST. 5, 96 (2009).  
 20.  Elizabeth F. Brown, E Pluribus Unum—Out of Many, One: Why the United 
States Needs a Single Financial Services Agency, 14 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 1, 6 (2005) 
(citing U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN, COMM. ON 
BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS, U.S. SENATE, FINANCIAL REGULATION: 
INDUSTRY CHANGES PROMPT NEED TO RECONSIDER U.S. REGULATORY STRUCTURE 110 
(2004)). 
 21.  Id. 
 22. Moran, supra note 19, at 96; Diana McMonagle, Comment, In Pursuit of 
Safety and Soundness: An Analysis of the OCC’s Anti-Predatory Lending Standard, 31 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1533, 1541–42 (2004) (summarizing the argument that federal 
regulators are in a “race to the bottom” often fueled by their need to obtain 
examination fees to fund their agencies). 
 23. See Christopher L. Peterson, Preemption, Agency Cost Theory, and Predatory 
Lending by Banking Agents:  Are Federal Regulators Biting Off More Than They Can 
Chew? 56 AM. U. L. REV. 515 (2007) (examining the agency-cost theory as it applies 
to all of the persons who conduct and oversee a lending transaction, and arguing 
6
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In addition to the restrictions that GLB eliminated, the 
drafters and supporters of GLB deliberately chose not to create 
regulations for hedge funds or derivatives.  Hedge funds are private 
pools of capital that are not open to the public, which means that 
there are few public statements about a fund’s activities and 
minimal transparency even to the investors who have provided the 
fund managers with millions of dollars.24  Estimates of the size of 
the hedge fund industry ranged from $1.2 to $2.4 trillion at its 
peak.25
Derivatives are essentially side-bets on whether a stock, bond, 
or the overall market will increase or decrease in value that do not 
require the bettor to ever purchase or sell the security itself.
  
26  For 
example, a derivative may be a bet related to whether the Standard 
& Poor’s 500 Index will rise or fall.27  It is used by responsible 
investors to hedge against losses, but can easily be abused.28
The earliest derivatives were sold in businesses called “bucket 




that federal regulators often do not place consumer protection as their primary 
goal); H.D. Vinod, Conflict of Interest Economics and Investment Analyst Biases, 70 
BROOK. L. REV. 53, 57 (2004) (“Unfortunately, what followed [the passage of GLB] 
was predicted by economists’ ‘capture theory’ of regulation: sophisticated and 
powerful financial institutions with considerable political clout simply captured or 
co-opted the regulators.”). 
  Many blame 
 24.  Duff McDonald, Running of the Hedgehogs, N.Y. MAG., Apr. 9, 2007, 
available at  http://nymag.com/news/features/2007/hedgefunds/30341 (stating 
that hedge funds are high risk and high reward that rely on leverage: “[T]hat 
means big bets with little or no downside protection.  In a word, risky.”); Carrie 
Johnson, Scrutiny Urged for Hedge Funds, WASH. POST, June 29, 2006, at D02 
(quoting Marc Kasowitz, a lawyer suing various hedge funds, who stated “no one” 
knows within a trillion dollars how large the hedge fund industry is and Senator 
Orrin Hatch who described hedge funds as the “Wild West of our financial 
markets”). 
 25.  Johnson, supra note 24, at D02. 
 26.  See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES: ACTIONS 
NEEDED TO PROTECT THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM, GAO/GGD-94-133, at 26 (1994); See also 
Jongho Kim, From Vanilla Swaps to Exotic Credit Derivatives: How to Approach the 
Interpretation of Credit Events, 13 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 705, 725–26 (2008) 
(providing an overview and definition of various forms of present-day credit 
derivatives instruments). 
 27. See Kim, supra note 26. 
 28. See id. 
 29. 60 Minutes: The Bet That Blew Up Wall Street (CBS television broadcast 
report by Steve Kroft Oct. 26, 2008) (“In the early part of the 20th century, the 
streets of New York and other large cities were lined with gaming establishments 
called ‘bucket shops,’ where people could place wagers on whether the price of 
stocks would go up or down without actually buying them. This unfettered 
speculation contributed to the panic and stock market crash of 1907, and state 
7
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these bucket shops as one of the causes of the stock market crash of 
1929,30 and laws were passed to ban bucket shops.31  Despite these 
early laws, derivatives rose to prominence again in the 1980s.32  The 
risks, however, remained the same.  Indeed, a May 1994 report to 
Congress by the General Accounting Office was entitled Financial 
Derivatives: Actions Needed To Protect the Financial System.33
Both hedge funds and derivatives encourage unsustainable 
borrowing and leveraging that resembles a Ponzi scheme.
 
34  
Ultimately, it undermines the entire economy.35
When the economy was strong and interest rates were low, 
Minsky said, firms would borrow themselves (and the 
economy as a whole) into periods of acute financial 
fragility, hence the economy’s ‘tendency to explode.’  
This tendency to explode resulted from structural biases 
in capitalist economies towards increasingly riskier forms 
of financing by firms.
  It is what 
economist Hyman Minsky described over fifty years ago as his 
“financial instability thesis”: 
36
Recognition of this risk was one of the primary reasons that 
Senator Byron Dorgan chose not to support GLB.  In fact, his 
speech against GLB on the floor of the senate was incredibly 
prescient.  More than any other, the speech accurately predicted 
the need for a massive government intervention just nine years 
later: 
   
 Is it part of financial modernization to say this sort of 
nonsense ought to stop; that banks ought not be able to 
trade derivatives on their own proprietary accounts 
because that is inherently gambling? . . . Does anybody 
 
laws all over the country were enacted to ban them.”) available at 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/10/26/60minutes/main4546199.shtml.  
See also Kenneth C. Kettering, Securitization and its Discontents: The Dynamics of 
Financial Product Development, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1553, 1655 (2008) (introducing 
the creation of “bucket shop” laws). 
 30. See 60 Minutes, supra note 29. 
 31. See Kettering, supra note 29 (describing the creation of “bucket shop” laws 
in “the late 1800s and early 1900s”). 
 32. Id. at 1654 (stating that “[t]he market in over-the-counter derivatives grew 
from essentially nothing to enormous size in the course of the 1980s”). 
 33. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 26, at 1. 
 34. See Josè Gabilondo, Leveraged Liquidity: Bear Raids and Junk Loans in the New 
Credit Market, 34 J. CORP. L. 447, 473 (2009) (describing how Ponzi financing 
arrangements operate).  
 35. See id. 
 36. Id. at 491. 
8
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think it makes any sense to have hedge funds out there 
with trillions of dollars of derivatives, losing billions of 
dollars and then being bailed out by a Federal Reserve–
led bailout because their failure would be so catastrophic 
to the rest of the market that we cannot allow them to fail? 
 And as banks get bigger, of course, we also have 
another doctrine.  The doctrine in banking at the Federal 
Reserve Board is called “too big to fail.”  Remember that 
term, “too big to fail.” It means at a certain level, banks 
get too big to fail.  They cannot be allowed to fail because 
the consequence on the economy is catastrophic and 
therefore these banks are too big to fail.  Virtually every 
single merger you read about in the newspapers these 
days means we simply have more banks that are too big to 
fail.  That is no-fault capitalism: too big to fail.  Does 
anybody care about that?  Does the Fed?  Apparently 
not. . . . 
 We have all these folks here who know a lot more 
about this than I do, I must admit, who say: [e]xcept we 
are creating firewalls.  We have subsidiaries, we have 
affiliates, we have firewalls.  They have everything except 
common sense; everything, apparently, except a primer 
on history.  I just wish, before people would vote for this 
bill, they would be forced to read just a bit of the financial 
history of this country to understand how consequential 
this decision is going to be.37
Despite Senator Dorgan’s speech, GLB overwhelmingly passed 
in the Senate and House of Representatives.  In the Senate, only 
nine Senators voted against GLB.  It passed in the House of 
Representatives on a 362 to 57 vote, and then was signed by 
President Clinton a few days later. 
 
2. The Commodity Futures Modernization Act 
Approximately a year after the passage of GLB, the absence of 
regulation related to derivatives, specifically credit default swaps, 
became the express policy of the United States.  In the late 1990s, 
the Commodities Futures Trading Commission attempted to fill 
the regulatory vacuum and oversee credit default swaps, but these 
 
 37. 145 CONG. REC. S4823 (daily ed. May 6, 1999) (statement of Sen. 
Dorgan). 
9
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efforts were challenged legally and publicly.38  One of the highest 
profile critics of efforts to regulate derivatives was Federal Reserve 
Chairman Alan Greenspan.39  Chairman Greenspan spoke out 
against regulation, even recanting his earlier support for regulating 
professional investors of derivatives.40
Then, in the waning days of the Clinton administration, 
Senator Phil Gramm inserted a 262-page amendment called the 
Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 into a much larger 
omnibus spending bill.
 
41  Without debate or even a hearing in the 
House of Representatives, the modern unregulated derivatives 
market was born.42  The Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 
2000 exempted most derivatives from federal oversight and 
regulation as well as preempted any state laws that may have 
prohibited the activity.43
Although derivatives based on securities, like stocks, may be 
regulated, derivatives on non-securities were exempted from the 
Act.
   
44  Therefore, credit default swaps based on pools of debt (like 
mortgages) were free from regulation because pools of debt are 
not technically securities.45
3. Blessing the Over-Leveraging of Wall Street Investment Banks 
 
The capital that investment banks or broker-dealers must 
 
 38. See Ted Kamman & Rory T. Hood, With the Spotlight on the Financial Crisis, 
Regulatory Loopholes, and Hedge Funds, How Should Hedge Funds Comply with the Insider 
Trading Laws?, 2009 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 357, 394–95 (2009). 
 39. Greenspan Urges Congress to Fuel Growth of Derivatives, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 
2000, at C19, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2000/02/11/business 
/greenspan-urges-congress-to-fuel-growth-of-derivatives.html. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Eric Lipton & Stephen Labaton, A Deregulator Looks Back, Unswayed, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 17, 2008, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/17/
business/worldbusiness/17iht-17gramm.17881800.htm; Nelson D. Schwartz & 
Julie Creswell, What Created This Monster?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2008, at BU 1, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/23/business/23how.html. 
 42. See 60 Minutes, supra note 29.  
 43. The Commodities Futures Modernization Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b-1, 78c-1 
(2000) (providing that swap agreements such as credit default swaps are not 
securities); see also Kamman & Hood, supra note 38 (discussing the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78c-1 (2006), which defines securities-based swaps and 
provides the Securities and Exchange Commission only the authority to regulate 
securities based swaps for fraud and nothing else, as well as no authority for non-
securities-based swaps).  
 44. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b-1, 78c-1. 
 45. Id. 
10
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maintain is governed by the Net Capital Rule, which was 
established in the mid-1970s.46  The Net Capital Rule, in essence, 
requires investment banks to review their balance sheets and 
categorize their tradable assets at market prices.47  A categorization 
of assets includes equities or stocks, as well as Treasury bills or 
bonds.48  Then, a discount or “haircut” is applied for each category, 
meaning an investment bank must set aside a certain amount of 
capital to protect itself from risk and market volatility.49  For 
example, equities had required a 15% haircut.50  The Net Capital 
Rule also required that broker dealers limit their debt-to-net capital 
ratio.51
The catalyst for originally passing this rule was the Securities 
and Exchange Commission’s concern about small, fly-by-night 
firms destabilizing the market and causing a “race to the bottom.”
 
52  
But, in 2004, support for the Net Capital Rule began to wane.  The 
SEC, concerned that the rule was too strict and would drive 
investment banks overseas,53 created a special program for the 
largest firms or broker-dealers.54  This new program was an 
alternative to the existing Net Capital Rule and its ratio 
requirements.55  Specifically, a broker-dealer that had capital of 
over $5 billion could, under the new Consolidated Supervised 
Entities program, use its own computer models as an alternative 
method of calculating ratio requirements.56
Five broker-dealers immediately volunteered for the program: 
  The program was 
essentially a very high-profile, high-stakes experiment in self-
regulation.  This, in practice, allowed for much higher amounts of 
debt. 
 
 46. Deryn Darcy, Credit Rating Agencies and the Credit Crisis: How the “Issuer 
Pays” Conflict Contributed and What Regulators Might Do About It, 2009 COLUM. BUS. 
L. REV. 605, 624 (2009); Julie Satow, Ex-SEC Official Blames Agency for Blow-Up of 
Broker-Dealers, N.Y. SUN, Sept. 18, 2008, available at http://www.nysun.com 
/business/ex-sec-official-blames-agency-for-blow-up/86130. 
 47. Darcy, supra note 46, at 624; Satow, supra note 46.  
 48. Satow, supra note 46. 
 49. Satow, supra note 46; see Darcy, supra note 46, at 625 n.191. 
 50. Satow, supra note 46. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Darcy, supra note 46, at 624. 
 53. See id. 
 54. See id. 
 55. Alternative Net Capital Requirements for Broker-Dealers That Are Part of 
Consolidated Supervised Entities, 17 C.F.R. §§ 200, 240 (2004); Satow, supra note 
46. 
 56. Satow, supra note 46. 
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Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, Goldman Sachs, 
and Morgan Stanley.57  Debt-to-net capital ratios soon became 
imbalanced, some as high as 40-to-1.58  Now, only Goldman Sachs 
and Morgan Stanley exist, but neither are broker-dealers.59  
Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley reorganized and obtained a 
federal charter to simply be bank-holding companies.60
In March 2008, Bear Stearns collapsed following the fall of two 
large hedge funds and the withdrawal of millions of dollars by 
major investors.
   
61  Soon, JPMorgan Chase & Co. swept in to buy 
Bear Stearns with the encouragement and blessing of the 
government, and Bear Stearns, as an independent entity, 
disappeared after eighty-five years.62  Lehman Brothers collapsed in 
mid-September 2008 and declared bankruptcy after failing to 
locate a buyer and the government refusing to bail out the 
company.63  And, on the brink of collapse, Bank of America 
purchased Merrill Lynch for $50 billion.64  It was a deal that was not 
only facilitated by the government, but also one in which Bank of 
America’s CEO claims the company was forced by the federal 
government to cooperate.65
B.  The “Giant Pool of Money” and the Perfect Storm 
   
Along with a lax, if not non-existent, regulatory environment, 
there was also a perfect storm of other factors that radically 
transformed the housing sector in the United States and, 
 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. See Jonathan Stempel, Goldman Sachs Wins NY State Banking Charter, 
REUTERS, Nov. 28, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/bankingFinancial/ 
idUSN2845074320081128. 
 60. Id.  
 61. See Roddy Boyd, The Last Days of Bear Stearns, FORTUNE, Mar. 31, 2008, 
http://money.cnn.com/2008/03/28/magazines/fortune/boyd_bear.fortune/
index.htm. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Andrew Ross Sorkin, Lehman Files for Bankruptcy; Merrill Is Sold, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 15, 2008, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/15/business/ 
15lehman.html?_r=2. 
 64. See Edmund L. Andrews, Bernanke Defends Role on Merrill, N.Y. TIMES, June 
26, 2009, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 2009/06/26/business/
26fed.html; Louise Story & Julie Creswell, For Bank of America and Merrill, Love Was 
Blind, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2009, at BU1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2009/02/08/business/08split.html. 
 65. Andrews, supra note 64. 
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ultimately, created the current financial crisis.  At the center of the 
storm, there was what a National Public Radio program described 
as a “giant pool of money.”66  The giant pool of money is all the 
money in the world that people are saving in case of a catastrophe, 
retirement, education, or just a rainy day.67  This giant pool of 
money equaled $70 trillion.68  It had doubled over the past few 
years from $36 trillion in 2000 to $70 trillion, as traditionally 
poorer countries became richer countries.69  This pool of money 
did not and does not just sit in a bank.70  Rather, people are 
responsible for safely investing such money to provide a nice profit 
for the bank as well as stability for the depositor.71
While the amount of money needed to be safely invested grew, 
the traditionally safe investment vehicles, like United States 
Treasury bonds, were no longer providing a sufficient return for 
the managers of the giant pool of money.
 
72  The value of the 
Treasury bonds’ return was suppressed by the extremely low 
interest rates at the time, about 1%.73  Therefore, the investors 
started looking for other financial products that were both low risk 
and provided a better return on the investment.74
The answer to this problem came in the form of Collateralized 
Debt Obligations (CDOs), Asset-Backed Securities (ABS), or 
Mortgage Backed Securities (MBS).
   
75  These are all roughly the 
same things: debt that has been pooled, converted into income 
streams, further divided, ranked, and transformed into bonds.76
 
 66. This American Life: The Giant Pool of Money (radio broadcast May 9, 2008 
Program #355), available at http://www.thislife.org/extras/radio/355_ 
transcript.pdf. 
  
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id.; Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, Turning a Blind Eye: Wall Street 
Finance of Predatory Lending, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2039, 2045–65 (2007) (explaining 
how securitization works and theoretically addressing the lemon problem, and 
discussing an “unholy alliance” of marginal lenders and loan aggregators affiliated 
with Wall Street); Christopher L. Peterson, Predatory Structured Finance, 28 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 2185, 2200–13 (2007) (describing how securitization works and how Wall 
Street simultaneously dupes homeowners and its own investors with bad predatory 
loans).  
 76. Peterson, supra note 75, at 2203. 
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Through these financial products, the managers of the giant pool 
of money were told they could have the security of an investment in 
a home mortgage loan without the hassle of dealing with actual 
homeowners.77
Due to the size of the giant pool of money and the early 
success of these securities, the demand was strong.
   
78  However, in 
order for Wall Street to sell CDOs, ABS or MBS to the managers of 
the giant pool of money, Wall Street needed a significant number 
of mortgages—far more than were historically being originated.79  
In response to this demand, underwriting standards deteriorated 
and the mortgage industry promoted new products that invited 
fraud and seemed pre-destined for foreclosure, such as a NINJA 
loan (No Income, No Job or Assets), a NINA (No Income, No 
Assets), stated-income, stated assets (no verification of application 
information, underwriting merely based on applicant’s statements), 
interest only mortgages, and Option Adjustable Rate Mortgages 
(ARMs) or Pick-A-Payment loans.80
The Option ARM or Pick-A-Payment loan was particularly 
lucrative and dangerous.
   
81  Option ARMs are a type of mortgage 
that typically provides the consumer three choices each month: (1) 
a fully amortizing payment—meaning a part of the payment pays 
both the interest and part of the principal balance, which causes 
the principal balance to go down; (2) an interest only payment, 
meaning that the principal amount of the loan stays the same and 
the homeowner pays only the interest; and (3) a negatively 
amortizing payment, meaning that the homeowner’s payment 
neither reduces the principal balance nor does it eliminate the 
accrued interest—the principal amount of the loan actually goes 
up.82
Option ARMs were originally created for a small niche market 
   
 
 77. This American Life: The Giant Pool of Money, supra note 66. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. LoanBiz.com, Alternative Documentation Loans: A Mortgage Solution for 
the Self Employed, http://www.loanbiz.com/alternative-documentation-loans-a-
mortgage-solution-for-the-self-employed.htm (last visited August 12, 2009).  
 81. Mara Der Hovanesian, Nightmare Mortgages, BUSINESSWEEK, Sept. 11, 2006, 
available at http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/06_37/b400000.htm; 
Jo Carrillo, Dangerous Loans: Consumer Challenges to Adjustable Rate Mortgages, 5 
BERKLEY BUS. L. J. 1, 20–21 (2008) (describing the various types of adjustable rate 
mortgages, including Option ARMs). 
 82. Carrillo, supra note 81. 
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of wealthy home buyers in the early 1980s.83  The product provided 
these wealthy home buyers with flexibility, as well as the ability to 
keep money that would ordinarily be used on a house payment 
available for other more lucrative investments.84  But, as home 
prices dramatically increased in certain markets from 2000 to 2007, 
unregulated brokers and banks pushed these products as a way to 
qualify more people for more expensive homes.85  This further 
inflated the housing bubble, and justified the origination of even 
more Option ARMs.86
Now, 80% of all option ARM borrowers make only the 
minimum payment each month, which means that they are not 
even paying the interest on their loan.
 
87  With the decrease in 
property values, many of these homeowners have no equity and are 
severely “underwater,” meaning they owe more on their mortgage 
than the home is worth.88  During the boom, the banks and owners 
of these mortgages were generally unconcerned, because the 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) accounting 
rules allow them to report “phantom profits.”89  Specifically, GAAP 
allows banks and investment companies to count as revenue the 
highest amount of an option ARM payment, the fully amortizing 
amount, even when borrowers choose to make only the minimum 
payment.90  In essence, banks and investment companies pretend 
that homeowners are paying more than they are paying each 
month toward the homeowners’ mortgages, which, in turn, inflates 
their earnings per share.91
These exotic mortgage products were a breeding ground for a 
variety of illegal behavior.  A 2006 study on behalf of the Mortgage 
Bankers Association found that 90% of all applications for stated 
income loans contained inflated income, and over 60% were 




 83. Der Hovanesian, supra note 
  The authors of the report warned: 
81. 
 84. This American Life: The Giant Pool of Money, supra note 66. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Der Hovanesian, supra note 81. 
 88. James Carlson, To Assign, Or Not To Assign: Rethinking Assignee Liability As A 
Solution To The Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 2008 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1021, 1033 
(2008).   
 89. Der Hovanesian, supra note 81. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Merle Sharick, Erin E. Omba, Nick Larson, & D. James Croft, Eighth 
Periodic Mortgage Fraud Case Report to Mortgage Bankers Association, (Mortgage Asset 
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“[s]tated income and reduced documentation loans speed up the 
approval process, but they are open invitations to fraudsters.”93
Government regulators did not intervene and issue regulations 
related to stated income and low-documentation loans, so lenders 
continued to compete furiously with one another to acquire these 
loans from brokers.
 
94  In an article entitled “Sex, Lies, and 
Subprime Mortgages,” the untoward conduct included untrained, 
uneducated, female mortgage wholesalers who received million-
dollar salaries to acquire mortgage loans from brokers and get 
underwriters to approve loans via sexual favors.95  The article 
further describes bribes and spiffs, fabricated documents, doctored 
pay stubs and bank account statements, embellished applicant job 
titles, and harassment of underwriters who refused to approve 
dubious loans.96
C.  Sub-Prime and Exotic Mortgages Go Mainstream and Then Go 
Boom 
 
“From 2000 to 2006, there was a dramatic increase in the 
number of sub-prime or Alt-A mortgages” described above.97
In 2000, the percentage of subprime mortgages 
comprised about 2% of the overall mortgage market.  In 
2003, the percentage of subprime mortgages increased to 
about 8%.  In 2006, the percentage more than doubled to 
22%.  In the meantime, the Alt-A market of exotic 
mortgages was created and soon occupied 18% of the 
total mortgage marketplace.  This growth in sub-prime 
and Alt-A mortgages means that the overall percentage of 
risky, toxic mortgages went from less than 5% to 40% of 
the overall housing market in less than seven years.
   
98
 
Research Inst., Inc., Reston, Va.), April 2006, at 12, http://www.
marisolutions.com/pdfs/mba/MBA8thCaseRpt.pdf.  
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Mara Der Hovanesian, Sex, Lies, and Mortgage Deals, BUS. WK., Nov. 24, 
2008, at 70, available at http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/08_47/
b4109070638235.htm (using the headline “Sex, Lies, and Subprime Mortgages”). 
 96. Id. 
 97. Mark Ireland & Ann Norton, Legal Tools to Revitalize Neighborhoods That 
Have Been Most Affected by the Foreclosure Crisis, THE COORDINATED PLAN TO ADDRESS 
FORECLOSURES (Minnesota Foreclosure Partners Council, Twin Cities and Greater 
Minnesota, Minn.), March 2009, at 3 (citing statistics from the Mortgage Bankers 
Association). 
 98. Id. 
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What made these mortgages so toxic were the terms.  Eighty-
nine to ninety-three percent of the subprime mortgages generated 
during this period came with an exploding adjustable interest rate 
after the initial teaser interest rate expired, and subprime 
adjustable rate mortgages were set to adjust from 7% to 12%.
 
99  As 
the amount of equity decreased and underwriting standards 
tightened, individual homeowners were no longer able to refinance 
their toxic mortgages and were forced to sell or go into 
foreclosure.100
Although there are no authoritative, historic compilations of 
foreclosure data,
 
101 there is little doubt that foreclosure rates are at 
high levels.102  It has been estimated that the nationwide 
foreclosure rate has more than doubled in the past eight years and 
is at the highest level in more than twenty-five years.103  The Center 
for Responsible Lending estimates that 15% of all subprime 
mortgages will result in foreclosure.104  These foreclosures, in the 
aggregate, will cause neighboring properties to lose billions of 
dollars in value and will thereby increase the number of blighted 
communities nationwide.105
 
 99. Ctr. for Responsible Lending, A Snapshot of the Subprime Market (Nov. 
28, 2007) (available at http://www.responsiblelending.org/mortgage-lending/
tools-resources/snapshot-of-the-subprime-market.pdf). 
 100. Ireland & Norton, supra note 97; Danielle DiMartino and John V. Duca, 
The Rise and Fall of Subprime Mortgages,  ECONOMIC LETTER Vol. 2, No. 11 (Federal 
Reserve Bank of Dallas, Dallas, Tex.), Nov. 2007 (“Some 80 percent of outstanding 
U.S. mortgages are prime, while 14 percent are subprime and 6 percent fall into 
the near-prime category. These numbers, however, mask the explosive growth of 
nonprime mortgages. Subprime and near-prime loans shot up from 9 percent of 
newly originated securitized mortgages in 2001 to 40 percent in 2006.”), available 
at http://www.dallasfed.org/research/eclett/2007/el0711.html#1. 
 101. Prentiss Cox, Foreclosure Reform Amid Mortgage Lending Turmoil: A Public 
Purpose Approach, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 683, 688–89 (2008) (citing The Ctr. For 
Statistical Research Inc., U.S. Mortgage Borrowing: Providing Americans with 
Opportunity, or Imposing Excessive Risk? 11–12 (2007)) (noting the lack of 
comprehensive data on foreclosures). 
 102. Id. (citing U.S. Dep’t of Housing & Urban Dev., National Data: Housing 
Finance, U.S. HOUS. MKT CONDITIONS, 3rd Quarter 1997, available at 
http://www.huduser.org/Periodicals/ushmc/fall97/nd_hf.html). 
 103. Id. at 691.  
 104. Id.  See also ELLEN SCHLOEMER ET AL., CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, 
LOSING GROUND: FORECLOSURES IN THE SUBPRIME MARKET AND THEIR COST TO 
HOMEOWNERS (Dec. 2006), http://www.responsiblelending.org/mortgage-lending/
research-analysis/foreclosure-paper-report-2-17.pdf. 
 105.  Cox, supra note 101, at 691. See also Ctr. for Responsible Lending, 
Subprime Spillover, Foreclosures Cost Neighbors $202 Billion; 40.6 Million Homes 
Lose $5,000 on Average (Jan. 18, 2008), http://www.responsiblelending.org 
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II. AN OVERVIEW OF ASSUMPTIONS AND REALITIES IN THE MODERN 
MORTGAGE LOAN MARKET USING THEORIES OF ASYMMETRICAL 
INFORMATION AND ECONOMIC GAME THEORY AS A GUIDE 
 
The intellectual underpinnings for the decisions outlined in 
Part I were set forth in the “competitive equilibrium paradigm” 
articulated by Adam Smith,106 John Maynard Keynes,107 and Ayn 
Rand:108 free markets inherently lead to Pareto-efficient outcomes, 
particularly if the government gets out of the way.109  Supporters of 
deregulation believed that there was no need for government 
regulation and oversight, because the market could effectively 
police itself.110
Supporters of deregulation also believed that issues created by 
asymmetrical information in mortgage lending—meaning that 
borrowers know more about their ability to repay the principal 
than lenders
  Why would a company ever do something that is not 
in its self-interest?   
111—could be overcome by the lenders themselves and 
that the government was no longer needed.112  Lenders can use 
mathematical models to discern key indicators of credit 
worthiness.113
 
/mortgage-lending/research-analysis/subprime-spillover.pdf (describing how 
foreclosures tend to depress neighboring property values, which results in a 
reduced tax base for the community). 
  With computers and other sophisticated systems to 
 106. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF 
NATIONS (University of Chicago Press 1977) (1776). 
 107. JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST 
AND MONEY (Palgrave Macmillan 2007) (1936). 
 108. AYN RAND, CAPITALISM: THE UNKNOWN IDEAL (Penguin Group 1986) 
(1966). 
 109. Joseph E. Stiglitz, Professor, Columbia Univ., Information and the 
Change in the Paradigm In Economics, Nobel Prize Lecture at 472 & 503–504 
(Dec. 8, 2001), available at http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/
laureates/2001/stiglitz-lecture.pdf (arguing that the market’s failure to effectively 
police problems, such as pollution, illustrates how “informational imperfections” 
in an economy may necessitate a government intervention). 
 110.  Id. (“[T]he most important single idea in economics is that competitive 
economies lead, as if by an invisible hand, to a (Pareto) efficient allocation of 
resources . . .”). 
 111. Press Release, The Royal Swedish Acad. of Scis. (Oct. 10, 2001), available 
at http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/2001/press.html.  
 112.  See id. at 505 (noting that asymmetries of information result in imperfect 
competition and thereby impede market efficiency). 
 113.  Id. at 477 (“Some, like George Stigler, while recognizing the importance 
of information, argued that once the real costs of information were taken into 
account, even with imperfect information, the standard results of economics 
would still hold.  Information was just a transactions cost.”). 
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compensate for limited information, policymakers believed that the 
market had finally reached its Pareto-equilibrium, a pure reflection 
of the true costs of goods.114
For example, at the height of the mortgage boom, Chairman 
Alan Greenspan touted the deregulation and consolidation 
resulting from the passage of GLB as a boon to consumers.
   
115
With these advances in technology, lenders have taken 
advantage of credit-scoring models and other techniques 
for efficiently extending credit to a broader spectrum of 
consumers. . . . Where once more-marginal applicants 
would simply have been denied credit, lenders are now 
able to quite efficiently judge the risk posed by individual 
applicants and to price that risk appropriately.
  He 
stated that “technological advancements” and complex algorithms 
could now accurately predict risk: 
116
In addition to technology, lenders were also relying heavily on 
three tools that many economists believed could mitigate the risks 
of asymmetrical information: signaling, screening and separating, 
and guarantees.  But all of these tools failed.   
 
Sub-Part A of this Section provides a brief definition of the 
tools used by the mortgage lending industry, and then Sub-Part B 
of this article uses economic game theory to explain why the tools 
of signaling, screening, and guarantees did not work.  Sub-Part A 
and Sub-Part B are included in this article because it is important 
to consider how these tools could have been effective when 
complemented by effective government regulation.  In essence, 
effective and targeted government regulation can ensure that bad 
actions have consequences that the free market cannot provide.   
A.  Asymmetrical Information in Mortgage Lending and the Common 
Tools Used to Mitigate Risk 
One of the most important modern developments in 
economic theory is the recognition that information plays a critical 
role in a functioning economy, and that asymmetrical information 
can have a negative impact on proper pricing and efficiency of the 
 
 114.  Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Bd. of Gov. of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 
Remarks to the Federal Reserve System Community Affairs Research Conference 5 
(Apr. 8, 2005) (transcript available at http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/historicaldocs/
ag05/download/29243/Greenspan_20050408.pdf). 
 115.  Id. 
 116.  Id. 
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market.117  In fact, economists Joseph Stiglitz, A. Michael Spence, 
and George A. Akerlof won the 2001 Nobel Prize in Economics for 
their analysis of markets with asymmetrical information.118
Stiglitz, Spence, and Akerlof were pioneers in asking questions 
about why consumers and sellers often act irrationally or not in 
their best interests; ultimately having adverse affects on the 
market.
  
119  Their conclusion was that in such situations there is an 
asymmetry of information.120
A mortgage transaction is one example of a market with 
asymmetrical information.  In these transactions, it has traditionally 
been assumed that the lender is in the weaker bargaining position 
because the homeowner obviously has more information about his 
or her own ability to pay.
 
121  In response, the lending industry 
developed tools to evaluate borrowers.  Three of the most common 
tools are signaling, screening and separating, and guarantees.122
1. Signaling Through Credit Scores   
 
The theory behind signaling and signaling models is that there 
is necessary information that one party does not have and cannot 
readily obtain, which requires that party to look at other attributes 
to “signal” the information that is actually sought.123
For example, an employer wants to know about the 
productivity of a job applicant.
   
124  Yet, the best person with the most 
accurate knowledge of a job applicant’s productivity is the actual 
applicant.125  Therefore, the employer often uses education as a 
signal of the applicant’s potential productivity.126  If the applicant’s 
education is low, it is assumed that the productivity is low.127
 
 117.  The Royal Swedish Acad. of Scis., supra note 
  If the 
applicant’s education is high, it is assumed, based upon the 
111. 
 118. Id. 
 119.  The Royal Swedish Acad. of Scis., supra note 111. 
 120.  Id. 
 121.  Joseph E. Stiglitz, Information and the Change in the Paradigm In Economics, 
92 AM. ECON. REV. 460, 470 (2002) (“[T]he borrower knows more about the 
riskiness of his project than the lender does . . .”). 
 122. Id. 
 123. A. Michael Spence, Signaling in Retrospect and the Informational Structure of 
Markets, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 434, 434 (2002). 
 124. Id. at 436–37. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
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attributes necessary to obtain such an education, that the 
applicant’s productivity is high.128
In mortgage lending, the credit score was one signal that was 
often relied upon above all other signals by lenders as well as by the 
underwriters, Wall Street investment firms, and credit rating 
agencies.
 
129  This was illustrated by the prevalence and popularity of 
the stated-income and stated-asset loans.130  Even after the loans 
acquired the nickname “liar’s loans” and it was well known that the 
stated information was very likely to be false, such loans continued 
to be originated based upon an applicant’s high credit score.131
2. Screening and Separating Through Actions 
 
The theory of both screening and separating is that, faced with 
a situation wherein a person has limited knowledge, that person 
can construct barriers or options that force the other party to 
screen and separate him or herself.132 In doing so, the more 
knowledgeable person conveys the necessary information to the 
other party.133  For example, an insurance company that only wants 
healthy insureds could locate itself on the fifth floor of a building 
with no elevator.  The willingness of an applicant to walk up the 
five flights of stairs, or a potential applicant’s decision not to walk 
up the five flights of stairs conveys information.134  The less 
informed party is forcing the other party to select or reject him or 
herself.135
Similarly, for example, an insurance company can offer a 
variety of insurance products, some with high co-payments and 
high deductibles with low monthly premiums, and others with low 
 
 
 128. Id. 
 129. Mark Gimein, Inside the Liar’s Loan, SLATE (Apr. 24, 2008), 
http://www.slate.com/id/2189576/ (“These were not ‘subprime’ loans. The 
borrowers’ average credit score was 705, well within prime territory.”); E. Scott 
Reckard, Defaults Exposing Truth of “Liar’s Loans”, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2008, 
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/businesstechnology/2004125368_liarloa
ns15.html (“Numbers from industry trackers suggest that these borrowers — most 
of whom boast respectable, often top-tier credit scores and appear to have 
substantial incomes and home equity—are starting to create a second tide of 
defaults in addition to the subprime-loan meltdown.”).  
 130. Reckard, supra note 129. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Stiglitz, supra note 121, at 463, 472. 
 133. Id. at 472. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
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co-payments and low-deductibles with high monthly premiums.136  
The various products theoretically force potential insureds to 
separate themselves.137  The applicants disclose their own 
perceptions of their health, based upon the types of plans that they 
choose.138  A healthy individual would likely choose the high co-
payment and high-deductible with low monthly premium, because 
that individual believes they are healthy and wants the lower 
monthly payment.139
In mortgage lending, the originators of mortgage loans offer a 
variety of products and interest rates.  The belief is that individuals 
that are the lowest credit risk and the most likely to repay the 
mortgage loan will not choose a sub-prime or high interest rate 
loan, because they know that they pay their bills and qualify for a 
better loan product.  Likewise, a sub-prime borrower knows that 
they are likely to default and have limited credit options.  
Therefore, they accept the higher interest rate.  The credit market, 
in theory, sorts itself. 
 
In separating, the lender relies heavily upon a mortgage 
broker to act in a manner that guides the homeowner to the 
appropriate mortgage product.  In practice, it has been found that 
such efficient and accurate separating did not occur.140 Many 
subprime borrowers could have qualified for prime loans.141
3. Guarantees 
 
In order for a more informed seller to assuage the fears of less 
informed “buyers,” sellers began offering guarantees to the buyers 
related to the quality of the goods or services.142  A good guarantee 
conveys needed and otherwise indiscernible information about the 
product to the buyer.143
 
 136. Id. at 479. See also Joseph E. Stiglitz, Monopoly, Non-Linear Pricing, and 
Imperfect Information: The Insurance Market, 44 REV. ECON. STUD. 407, 414 (1977). 
  The better the guarantee, the buyer is 
intended to assume and believe that the product is better.  In that 
 137. Stiglitz, supra note 136 at 414–21.  
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 419. 
 140. ACORN, SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL: PREDATORY LENDING IN AMERICA 44 (Feb. 
2004), available at http://www.acorn.org/fileadmin/Community_Reinvestment/
Reports/S_and_E_2004/separate_and_unequal_2004.pdf. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Stiglitz, supra note 121, at 468. 
 143. Id. 
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sense, a guarantee is a type of signal.144
In the mortgage lending industry, the use of guarantees was 
common at virtually every stage.  Borrowers signed a guarantee in 
connection with their mortgage loan application.
  It is, however, more direct 
than employment history, education, or credit scores in 
determining the likelihood of paying back a loan. 
145  The standard, 
boilerplate 1003 mortgage loan application contains a lengthy 
“Acknowledgement and Agreement” that states that the borrower 
understands that the lender is relying on all of the information in 
the application.146  The borrower then acknowledges that false 
statements may result in civil penalties as well as criminal 
punishment, fines or imprisonment.147
Mortgage brokers sign an agreement with the lenders or 
originators of a mortgage loan, stating that they will not submit a 
loan application that contains false or misleading information. 
Most lenders further require that the brokers agree to “buy back” 
mortgage loans, if it is discovered that there was fraud in the 
application and origination of the loan. 
    
Similarly, the lenders or originators of mortgage loans made 
further guarantees related to the absence of fraud when that loan is 
securitized.148  Lenders and originators also agreed to buy back 
loans that defaulted within a certain period of time; underwriters 
often provided further guarantees to investors related to the overall 
performance of the pool of mortgage loans.149  These were internal 
and external enhancements that included buy-back provisions and 
insurance in the event that fraud was discovered or performance 
failed to meet certain expectations.150  The credit rating agencies, 
like Moody’s, Fitch, and Standard & Poor’s, relied heavily on these 
guarantees in rating the bond certificates.151
 
 144. Id. 
  Absent these 
guarantees, the bonds would not have been investment-grade and 
 145. Uniform Residential Loan Application Form 1003, available at 
https://www.efanniemae.com/sf/formsdocs/forms/pdf/sellingtrans/1003.pdf.  
All mortgage  loans contain some sort of signing statement; the most prevalent is 
the signing statement contained in the 1003 Form produced and distributed by 
Fannie Mae. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Engel & McCoy, supra note 75, at 2070. 
 149. Id. at 2062. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. at 2046. 
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would likely have not been sold.152
B.  The Housing Bubble and Foreclosure Crisis Viewed Through the 
Lens of Economic Game Theory 
 
As stated above, there was a working assumption that 
computer models, complex algorithms, and mitigation tools 
effectively managed risk without government regulation.153  It was 
an assumption premised on the idea that an efficient equilibrium 
in a market not only exists, but that it can also be reached by the 
market actors themselves.154  Specifically, each individual actor 
within an economic market is so small that his interactions do not 
and cannot affect the entire market.155
Game theory, including the behavioral and emotional 
branches of economic game theory, recognizes that such perfect 
competition is unrealistic.
   
156  The assumption of “small” actors—
whose fraud, strategies and misdeeds don’t have an effect—is not 
universally true and arguably not even that common.157  Going back 
to the seminal book Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, 
published in 1944, game theory recognizes that there can be very 
large actors whose actions can interfere with the holy grail of 
perfect competition and Pareto equilibrium.158
The mortgage lending industry and post-GLB financial services 
industry is just such an economic market where the actions of 
relatively few actors have a profound effect upon the market as a 
whole.  For example, there are very few major credit rating 
agencies for mortgage-backed securities.  The decision by any one 
of these credit rating agencies to downgrade the investment quality 
of such mortgage-backed securities or deny a triple-A bond rating 
   
 
 152. Id. 
 153. See supra note 116 and accompanying text. 
 154. Id. 
 155. See John C. Harsanyi, Games with Incomplete Information, Nobel Lecture 
at the Haas School of Business, University of California, Berkeley, (Dec. 9, 1994), 
available at http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/1994/ 
harsanyi-lecture.pdf.  
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. at 136 (“[F]or most parts of the economic system, perfect competition 
would now be an unrealistic assumption.  Most industries are now dominated by a 
small number of large firms, and labor is often organized in large labor unions.  
Moreover, the central government and many other government agencies are 
major players in many markets as buyers and sometimes also as sellers, as 
regulators, and as taxing and subsidizing agents.”). 
 158. Id. 
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to sub-prime or Alt-A (e.g., low doc, no doc, or option ARMs) 
securities could have had a substantial impact in preventing the 
current foreclosure and economic crisis.  If the credit rating 
agencies had scrutinized pools of mortgage loans more carefully, 
lenders would have been forced to provide and adhere to stricter 
underwriting standards, and the credit rating agencies would have 
likely demanded further internal and external enhancements for 
top-rated, triple-A bonds.  
The larger vertically and horizontally integrated financial 
services companies, as well as the role of Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac, further undermine the concept of a small, single actor whose 
decisions have no impact on the overall market.  Therefore, the 
decision to deregulate, as outlined in Part I, and rely on the 
traditional mitigation tools outlined in Part II, Sub-Part A, fail to 
consider how the unfettered ability of this relatively small number 
of actors to generate or approve trillions of dollars of mortgage 
loans could destabilize not just the housing market but the global 
economy.  The housing bubble and the economic collapse can be 
traced to just a handful of financial services companies that 
generated, underwrote, or securitized billions of dollars of 
mortgage loans and related securities.   
The mortgage lending industry or housing market may be 
fairly categorized as an I-Game, meaning that there is incomplete 
information among the actors, as compared to a C-Game, meaning 
that there is complete information among the actors.  The failure 
of signaling, screening and separating, and guarantees is most 
easily traced to the fact that the market actors were participating in 
an on-going or continuous I-Game.  While such tools may be 
effective in self-regulating a single transaction, the entire mortgage 
lending industry (from the broker to the investor) was not 
participating in a single transaction.  There were multiple 
transactions over the course of many years with enormous pressure 
for the companies to reap large returns or profits.  This had an 
impact on the actor’s strategies, incentives, and priorities.  Each 
actor was gathering information and analyzing short-term and long-
term risks of violating contractual terms, bargaining in bad faith, or 
even behaving illegally.   
C.  What Will the Punishment Be?   
The broker is evaluating what punishment, if any, will truly 
occur for fraudulently inflating an applicant’s income in a stated-
25
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income or low documentation loan.  The lender is evaluating 
whether the underwriter or bondholders will actually exercise their 
buy-back rights.  The credit reporting agencies are evaluating 
whether they will lose business if they toughen their rating 
requirements.  In an isolated transaction, the market actors’ 
analyses would be different.  Indeed, the misplaced market 
incentives of this continuous I-Game was illustrated during a 
Congressional hearing related to credit rating agencies and the 
financial crisis, showing that competition for business among the 
credit rating agencies skewed their business model.159
For example, one confidential presentation to the Board of 
Directors of Moody’s stated the following under the header 
“CONFLICT OF INTEREST”: 
 
Ideally, competition [among credit rating agencies] would 
be primarily on the basis of ratings quality, with a second 
component of price and a third component of service. . . .  
The real problem is not that the market does 
underweights [sic] ratings quality but rather that, in some 
sectors, it actually penalizes quality by awarding rating 
mandates based on the lowest credit enhancement 
needed for the highest rating.  Unchecked, competition 
on this basis can place the entire financial system at risk.  
It turns out that ratings quality has surprisingly few 
friends: issuers want high ratings; investors don’t want 
rating downgrades; short-sighted bankers labor short-
sightedly to game the rating agencies for a few extra basis 
points on execution.160
This memorandum clearly describes how there were and are 




 159. Credit Rating Agencies and the Financial Crisis: Hearing Before the H. Oversight 
Comm., 111th Cong. (2008).  
  Credit rating agencies had 
pressure to maintain market share, while trying to keep perspective 
and ethics in the midst of an onslaught of investment bankers and 
lenders pitching them deals and tempting them to “drink the Kool-
 160. Memorandum from Raymond McDaniel, Chairman and Chief Executive 
Officer, Moody’s Corp., on Credit Policy Issues at Moody’s Suggested by the 
Subprime/Liquidity Crisis to the Board of Directors at Moody’s Corp. (Oct. 
21, 2007), http://oversight.house.gov/images/stories/Hearings/Committee_
on_Oversight/Confidential_Presentation_to_Moodys_Board_of_Directors_October
_2007.pdf, (provided in a confidential presentation to Moody’s Board of 
Directors, made public at Credit Rating Agencies and the Financial Crisis: Hearing 
Before the H. Oversight Comm., 111th Cong. (Oct. 22, 2008)).   
 161. Id. 
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Aid.”162
The market actors ultimately determined that there was little 
risk to originating more mortgage loans, while there could be 
serious consequences for originating fewer.  That is why signaling, 
screening and separating and guarantees failed.  The traditional 
reliance upon a borrower’s credit score as a “signal” failed because 
the other information used to underwrite a loan (income, debt, 
assets) was often false.
  
163  There was seemingly no penalty for 
providing such false information, and an immediate financial 
reward for originating the mortgage loan.164
The reliance on a broker to help sort and separate 
homeowners into the appropriate financial product failed because 
brokers were financially rewarded by lenders to steer borrowers 
into high-cost loans.
   
165  The reliance on guarantees similarly failed 
because all of the actors perceived little risk of punishment for 
breaching their guarantees and many of the brokers and lenders 
were under-capitalized.166  Once pervasive fraud or illegal business 
practices were identified, the mortgage brokers and lenders simply 
disappeared or declared bankruptcy.167  Thus, mortgage brokers 
and lenders avoided any pecuniary punishment.168  Their 
guarantees were of no value.169
 
 162. Id. 
 
 163. Der Hovanesian, supra note 95. 
 164. Id. 
 165. See CENTER FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, YIELD SPREAD PREMIUMS: A POWERFUL 
INCENTIVE FOR EQUITY THEFT, CRL ISSUE BRIEF NO. 11, JUNE 18, 2004, available at 
http://www.responsiblelending.org/mortgage-lending/tools-resources/ib011-
YSP_Equity_Theft-0604.pdf. 
 166. This phenomenon is aptly described, along with other issues surrounding 
securitization by Professor Eggert, in a 2002 law review article that was incredibly 
forward-thinking, published six years before the complete economic melt-down.  
Although Professor Eggert describes the consequences to consumers, the 
undercapitalization has an effect both up and down the vertical economic stream:   
[B]ecause securitization allows individuals with little or no 
capital of their own to originate or broker loans, it dramatically 
reduces the likelihood that the borrower can obtain any sort of 
repayment for her damages from the broker or originator, who 
can easily avoid paying any sizeable damages judgment by 
declaring bankruptcy or merely disappearing.  
Kurt Eggert, Held up in Due Course: Predatory Lending, Securitization, and the Holder in 
Due Course Doctrine, 35 CREIGHTON L. REV. 503, 556 (2002).   
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
 169. An apt illustration of the worthless guarantee is featured in the movie 
Tommy Boy staring the now-deceased comedian Chris Farley.  In the movie, the 
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III. MINNESOTA’S ANTI-PREDATORY LENDING LAW 
Although the ability for states to regulate lending is limited by 
federal preemption, many states have passed or updated laws that 
regulate the conduct of mortgage brokers and certain lending 
practices.170
 
Chris Farley character (Tommy) is attempting to save his father’s auto-parts 
factory by going on a major sales trip with the actor David Spade (Richard 
Hayden).  In closing his first major sale, Tommy must overcome the fact that his 
primary competition guarantees their product: 
  For example, some states prohibit churning, meaning 
that a homeowner is refinanced repeatedly with little to no benefit, 
Tommy: Let’s think about this for a sec, Ted, why would somebody put a 
guarantee on a box? Hmmm, very interesting.  
Ted Nelson, Customer: Go on, I’m listening.  
Tommy: Here’s the way I see it, Ted. Guy puts a fancy guarantee on a box 
‘cause he wants you to feel all warm and toasty inside.  
Ted Nelson, Customer: Yeah, makes a man feel good.  
Tommy: ‘Course it does. Why shouldn’t it? Ya figure you put that little box 
under your pillow at night, the Guarantee Fairy might come by and leave 
a quarter, am I right, Ted?  
[chuckles until he sees that Ted is not laughing too]  
Ted Nelson, Customer: [impatiently] What’s your point?  
Tommy: The point is, how do you know the fairy isn’t a crazy glue sniffer? 
“Building model airplanes” says the little fairy; well, we’re not buying it. 
He sneaks into your house once, that’s all it takes. The next thing you 
know, there’s money missing off the dresser, and your daughter’s 
knocked up. I seen it a hundred times.  
Ted Nelson, Customer: But why do they put a guarantee on the box?  
Tommy: Because they know all they sold ya was a guaranteed piece of s***. 
That’s all it is, isn’t it? Hey, if you want me to take a dump in a box and 
mark it guaranteed, I will. I got spare time. But for now, for your 
customer’s sake, for your daughter’s sake, ya might wanna think about 
buying a quality product from me.  
Ted Nelson, Customer: [pause] Okay, I’ll buy from you. 
TOMMY BOY, (Paramount Pictures 1995), available at http://www.imdb.com/
title/tt0114694/quotes (last visited Aug. 12, 2009). 
 170. Preemption has its roots in the Supremacy Clause of the United States 
Constitution, which invalidates state laws that interfere with or are contrary to 
federal law.  See U.S. CONST. art VI, § 2.  Under our dual banking system, 
commercial banks have the option of being federally or state chartered.   Federally 
chartered (national) banks are governed by the National Bank Act of 1874, which 
sets forth chartering criteria, basic banking and investment powers, lending and 
borrowing limitations, and corporate powers and duties. 12 U.S.C. §§ 21–43. 
Pursuant to the NBA, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency is charged 
with the regulation of national banks.  See generally 12 U.S.C. § 21 (2006).  The 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency has taken an expansive view of its power 
to pre-empt.  See 69 Fed. Reg. 1904-01; 12 C.F.R. § 34.4 (2004); see also National 
Conference of State Legislatures, Mortgage Lending Practices State Statutes, 
http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=12511 (last visited Aug. 18, 2009) 
(summarizing other conduct specific prohibitions). 
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as well as negative amortization loans.171  Other states license 
mortgage brokers and require that the mortgage brokers post a 
surety bond.172
But Minnesota has the most comprehensive Anti-Predatory 
Lending Law in the country.
   
173  Indeed, a New York Times editorial 
called the law “farsighted” and “excellent.”174
A.Summary of Minnesota’s Anti-Predatory Lending Law 
  The tools provided 
by and the scope of Minnesota’s Anti-Predatory Lending Law are 
described in Sub-Part A.  Sub-Part B describes the first case brought 
under the statute. 
Individual provisions within Minnesota’s Anti-Predatory 
Lending Law are important, but what makes the law a model is its 
comprehensive approach to the problem.  The amendments passed 
in 2007 did not just add new standards of conduct, but also created 
powerful enforcement tools and meaningful remedies as well as 
making existing laws more effective.  Finally, and most importantly, 
the new law creates a duty of agency between the borrower and the 
 
 171. See ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 23-53-101 to -106 (2009 Supp.); CAL. FIN. CODE §§ 
4970, 4973 (West Supp. 2009); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 5-3.5-101 (West Supp. 
2009); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-40-105 (West Supp. 2009); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 
494.0078–.00797 (West 2006 & Supp. 2009); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 7-6A-1 to -13 (2004 
& Supp. 2009); 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 77/1–77/99 (West 2001 & Supp. 2009); 
815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 137/1–137/75 (West 2008); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 
286.8-010 to -990 (LexisNexis 2007 & Supp. 2009); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 360.100 
(LexisNexis 2008); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9-A, §§ 2-509, 8-103, 8-206-A, 10-102 
(2009); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9-B, § 429 (2009); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 506 
(Supp. 2008); MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW §§ 12-127, -311, -409.1, -1029 (LexisNexis 
Supp. 2009); NM. STAT. ANN. §§ 58-21A-1 to -14 (2003 & Supp. 2009); OKLA. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 14A, § 3-204 (West Supp. 2010); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, §§ 2081–2093 
(West Supp. 2010); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 34-23-5, -25.2-1 to -15 (Supp. 2008); S.C. 
CODE ANN. §§ 37-23-10 to -85 (Supp. 2008); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 45-20-101 to -111 
(2007); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 6.1-422 to -422.1 (Supp. 2009); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 
428.202–.211 (West 2005 & Supp. 2009); see also Nat’l Conference of State 
Legislatures, Mortgage Lending Practices, http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=
12511 (last visited Nov. 17, 2009).  Minnesota’s Anti-Predatory Lending Law is not 
included in this list because it will be discussed in detail in Section III, Sub-Part A. 
 172. The following is a sample of requirements by some state statutes: Arizona 
($10,000 to $15,000 bond, three years experience and pass written exam); 
Arkansas (net worth of $25,000 and surety bond of $35,000); Connecticut (surety 
bond of $40,000); Kentucky (surety bond for $50,000 and training course); 
Nebraska (surety bond for $50,000); Texas (net worth of $25,000 or surety bond of 
$50,000). 
 173. MINN. STAT. § 58.13 (2008). 
 174. Editorial, Common Sense in Lending, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2009, at WK9, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/08/opinion/08sun3.html. 
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mortgage broker.  This duty creates a general and flexible tool to 
combat the new schemes of tomorrow’s predatory lenders. 
1. Enforcement and Remedies 
Until the passage of Minnesota’s Anti-Predatory Lending Law, 
no express private right of action existed for consumers that 
specifically targeted illicit lending practices.  The new law did not 
just give homeowners the private right to enforce new standards of 
conduct in Minnesota, but it also provided an expansive private 
right of action for “any violation of state or federal law regulating 
residential mortgage loans,” and misconduct by appraisers.175  The 
remedies for violations are cumulative but include (1) actual, 
incidental, and consequential damages; (2) statutory damages 
equal to the amount of all lender fees included in the amount of 
the principal of the residential mortgage loan as defined in section 
58.137; (3) punitive damages if appropriate, and as provided in 
sections 549.191 and 549.20; and (4) court costs and reasonable 
attorneys’ fees.176
The new law, however, only applies to non-bank lenders and 
mortgage brokers, including brokers who help originate mortgages 
for state and federally chartered banks.
   
177  It exempts state and 
federally chartered banks from liability under the Act.178
The new Anti-Predatory Lending Law also created a new crime 
of “Residential Mortgage Fraud.”  The law makes it illegal 
whenever a person: 
  This 
limitation is due to federal pre-emption, and does not and should 
not be replicated in a federal statute that uses the Minnesota Anti-
Predatory Lending Law as a model.   
 
 175. MINN. STAT. § 58.18 (2008) (giving private right of action for any violation 
of the standards of conduct in section 58.13, including subdivision 1(8)); MINN. 
STAT. § 82B.24 (2008) (creating a private right of action related to appraiser 
misconduct). 
 176. MINN. STAT. § 58.18, subdiv. 1, 3 (2008); MINN. STAT. § 82B.24, subdiv. 1, 3 
(2008). 
 177. See id. §§ 58.04, subdiv. 4, 58.13, subdiv. 1 (b). 
 178. See id. §§ 58.04, subdiv. 4, 58.13, subdiv. 1 (b).  It should be noted that 
mortgage brokers who help originate a mortgage loan on behalf of a state or 
federally chartered bank are covered by Minnesota’s Anti-Predatory Lending Law 
and can be liable for damages under the Act.  The federal pre-emption of state 
laws does not extend to mortgage brokers, and one of the main purposes for 
enacting the law were the predatory lending practices that were facilitated by 
mortgage brokers regardless of whether they were helping to originate a non-bank 
lender’s mortgage loan or a state or federally chartered bank.  
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(1) knowingly makes or causes to be made any deliberate 
and material misstatement, misrepresentation, or 
omission during the mortgage lending process with the 
intention that it be relied on by a mortgage lender, 
borrower, or any other party to the mortgage lending 
process;  
(2) knowingly uses or facilitates the use of any deliberate 
and material misstatement, misrepresentation, or 
omission, knowing the same to contain a material 
misstatement, misrepresentation, or omission, during the 
mortgage lending process with the intention that it be 
relied on by a mortgage lender, borrower, or any other 
party to the mortgage lending process; or  
(3) conspires to violate clause (1) or (2).179
2. Mortgage Broker and Non-Bank Lender Standards of Conduct 
 
There are twenty-seven separate standards of conduct for 
“mortgage originators,” with five of those standards having been 
enacted as part of the 2007 Minnesota Anti-Predatory Lending 
Law.180
a. Prohibiting a Mortgage Originator From Setting a 
Homeowner up for Failure 
  The existing standards of conduct, however, are also 
important.  Because the legislature gave a private right of action for 
violations of any of the twenty-seven standards, each should be 
reviewed for applicability in any action.  The following are some of 
the most important standards of conduct set forth in the statute. 
There are four standards that prohibit a mortgage broker or 
mortgage loan originator from not acting in the borrower or 
homeowner’s best interest.  These standards include making or 
 
 179. Id. § 609.822. 
 180. MINN. STAT. § 58.02 subdiv. 19 (2008)  
‘Residential mortgage originator’ means a person who, directly 
or indirectly, for compensation or gain or in expectation of 
compensation or gain, solicits or offers to solicit, or accepts or 
offers to accept an application for a residential mortgage loan 
through any medium or mode of communication from a 
borrower, or makes a residential mortgage loan. ‘Residential 
mortgage originator’ includes a lender as defined in subdivision 
11 and a broker as defined in subdivision 13.); MINN. STAT. § 
58.13, subdiv.1 (b)(2008).  Subdivision (a)(23) to (27) were 
part of the 2007 Minnesota Anti-Predatory Lending law. 
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assisting with the origination of a loan “with the intent that the 
loan will not be repaid” and that title will transfer to the originator 
through foreclosure;181 making or assisting with the origination of a 
loan that is “of a lower investment grade” than the homeowner or 
borrower would otherwise qualify for based on his or her credit 
score;182 making or assisting with the origination of a loan without 
verifying the borrower’s ability to pay the fully amortizing rate;183 
and engaging in “churning,” meaning that the new loan does not 
provide a reasonable, tangible net benefit to the borrower.184
With regard to verifying an individual’s ability to pay, it is 
important to note that the “ability” of the borrower cannot be 
based upon the initial teaser rate.
 
185  Previously, it was common for 
predatory lenders to underwrite to the initial teaser rate and not 
consider the ability to pay once the teaser rate expired.186
b. Inflating Appraisals 
  Under 
this provision, the borrower must have sufficient income or other 
assets to pay the loan when the rate adjusts to its true interest rate. 
Mortgage loan originators, including mortgage brokers, are 
prohibited from compensating, directly or indirectly, coercing or 
intimidating an appraiser for the purpose of influencing the 
judgment of the appraiser related to the value of the borrower’s 
home.187
c. Banning Toxic or Exploitative Mortgages 
  
Mortgage loan originators are prohibited from making, 
providing, or arranging for a loan that allows for negative 
amortization during any six-month period.188  The law further 
prohibits the origination of a loan that refinances or pays-off a 
“special mortgage,” unless the borrower has received counseling 
from an authorized, independent loan counselor.189
 
 181. MINN. STAT. § 58.13, subdiv. 1 (a)(13) (2008). 
  For example, 
 182. Id. § 58.13, subdiv. 1 (a)(18). 
 183. Id. § 58.13, subdiv. 1 (a)(24). 
 184. Id. § 58.13, subdiv. 1 (a)(25). 
 185. See id.  
 186. PRENTISS COX, CONSUMER FRAUD AND DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICE 
REGULATION IN MINNESOTA 8–3(A)(1) (2d ed. 2009).   
 187. MINN. STAT. § 58.13, subdiv. 1(11) (2008). 
 188. Id. § 58.13, subdiv. 1(27). 
 189. Id. § 58.13, subdiv. 1(23). 
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a homeowner who has a zero interest or total forgiveness loan 
through a charity, like Habitat for Humanity, needs to receive 
housing counseling prior to refinancing out of such a special 
mortgage.  This provides extra protection to vulnerable 
homeowners who may otherwise be convinced by an unscrupulous 
mortgage broker to give up a zero interest loan to pay-off 
unsecured credit card debt. 
d. Truthful Marketing: Apples to Apples 
In addition to general prohibitions of false and misleading 
advertising,190
The amendment creates a new standard of conduct that 
requires that a homeowner be informed about the total monthly 
payment, including “the amount of the anticipated or actual 
periodic payments for property taxes and hazard insurance.”
 the law was further amended to specifically prohibit a 
common tactic used by mortgage brokers: comparing apples to 
oranges.  Often a homeowner will be told that refinancing will 
result in significantly lower monthly payment.  After closing, the 
homeowner discovers that the quoted, new monthly payment does 
not include taxes and insurance.   
191  
However, disclosure must also indicate if the refinanced loan does 
not have an escrow account.192
e. Handling Client Funds 
 
Three of the standards of conduct relate to the handling of 
client funds.193  Minnesota Statute  section 58.13,  subdivision 1(1) 
prohibits a mortgage loan originator, which includes a broker, 
from failing to “maintain a trust account to hold trust funds 
received in connection with a residential mortgage loan,”194 and 
subdivision 1(2) prohibits a mortgage loan originator from failing 
to “deposit all trust funds into a trust account within three business 
days of receipt; commingle trust funds with funds belonging to the 
licensee or exempt person; or use trust account funds for any 
purpose other than that for which they are received.”195
 
 190. Id. § 58.13, subdiv. 1(9), (19). 
  
 191. Id. § 58.13, subdiv. 1(26). 
 192. Id. 
 193. See id. § 58.13, subdiv.  1(1)–(2), (4). 
 194. Id. § 58.13, subdiv. 1(1). 
 195. Id. § 58.13, subdiv. 1(2). 
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Subdivision 1(4) prohibits a mortgage loan originator from failing 
to “disburse funds according to its contractual or statutory 
obligations.”196
f. Catchall  
 
In addition to the specific prohibitions, the code of conduct 
also includes a catchall.197  The catchall provision makes a violation 
of any state or federal law “regulating residential mortgage loans” a 
basis for a cause of action.198
3. A 5% Limit on Financed Charges 
  
In 2001, the Minnesota State Legislature amended chapter 58 
to limit “lender fees” that are financed as part of the principal loan 
amount.199  The limit is five percent.200  In 2007, the definition of 
lender fee broadened to not just include the charges “payable by 
the borrower.”201  Lender fee now includes all charges paid “by the 
lender to a mortgage broker.”202
This is an important change because yield spread premiums 
have been an on-going concern to consumer advocates for many 
years.   
  Therefore, a “yield spread 
premium” paid outside of closing by a lender to a mortgage broker 
counts toward the 5% cap on financed charges. 
A YSP [Yield Spread Premium] is a cash bonus that a 
broker receives from a lender for placing borrowers in a 
loan with a higher interest rate than the lender would 
accept.  The higher the interest rate, the higher the 
premium received by the broker. These kickbacks provide 
brokers a strong incentive to charge borrowers a higher 
interest rate when they could qualify for a less expensive 
loan.  The effect of YSPs is to steal equity from struggling 
families.203
 
 196. Id. § 58.13, subdiv. 1(4). 
 
 197. See id. § 58.13, subdiv. 1(8). 
 198. Id. 
 199. COX, supra note 186, at 8–8(C). 
 200. MINN. STAT. § 58.137, subdiv. 1 (2008).  It should also be noted that 
federal statute does not preempt Minnesota’s limits on financed charges 
proscribed in this statute.  See COX, supra note 186.  Minnesota opted-out of the 
preemption.  Id. (citing MINN. STAT. §§ 47.203–.204 (1999)). 
 201. See MINN. STAT. § 58.137, subdiv. 1 (2008). 
 202. Id. 
 203. Center for Responsible Lending, supra note 165 
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For example, a single mother who was assisted by the Center 
for Responsible Lending paid a broker over $9,000 in settlement 
charges on just a $43,750 mortgage loan.204  The interest rate was 
13.74%.205  The YSP was $2,680, approximately six points, meaning 
that the borrower qualified for a significantly lower interest rate 
and monthly payment.206  Why did the broker not provide her with 
the lower cost loan?  Including the Yield Spread Premium, the 
broker’s total compensation was nearly $6,000, more than 13% of 
the loan amount.207  Under Minnesota’s Anti-Predatory Lending 
Law, this transaction would be illegal.208
4. The Creation of Agency and Agency Relationship Between 
Borrowers and Mortgage Brokers. 
 
The new Anti-Predatory Lending Law also creates an agency 
relationship between borrowers and their mortgage brokers.209  
Minnesota Statute section 58.161, subdivision 1 then sets forth five 
specific duties.210  First, mortgage brokers must “act in the 
borrower’s best interest and in the utmost good faith toward 
borrowers.”211  The broker also is prohibited from acting, giving, or 
charging “any undisclosed compensation or realize any undisclosed 
remuneration, either through direct or indirect means, that inures 
to the benefit of the mortgage broker on an expenditure made for 
the borrower.”212  Second, brokers are required to carry out all 
“lawful instructions” given to them from the borrowers.213  Third, 
mortgage brokers must disclose to borrowers all material facts that 
might reasonably affect the borrower’s rights, interests, or ability to 
receive an intended benefit from the residential mortgage loan.214  
Fourth, mortgage brokers are required to use “reasonable care in 
performing duties,”215
 
 204. Id. 
 and, fifth, mortgage brokers must account to 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. 
 208. MINN. STAT. § 58.137, subdiv. 1 (2008). 
 209. Id. § 58.161. 
 210. Id. § 58.161, subdiv. 1(1)–(5). 
 211. Id § 58.161, subdiv. 1(1). 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. § 58.161, subdiv. 1(2). 
 214. Id. § 58.161, subdiv. 1(3). 
 215. Id. § 58.161, subdiv. 1(4). 
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the borrower all of the money and property received as agent.216
5. Licensing and Bond 
 
The “Minnesota Residential Mortgage Originator and Servicer 
Licensing Act” provides further protection for homeowners and 
borrowers.217  Although not technically part of the 2007 Anti-
Predatory Lending Law, the Minnesota Residential Mortgage 
Originator and Servicer Licensing Act was also amended in 2007 to 
compliment the provisions and rights outlined above.218  
Specifically, the Act now requires mortgage brokers to submit a 
surety bond or irrevocable letter of credit in the amount of at least 
$50,000 to pay for, among other things, expenses, fines, and fees 
levied by the commissioner under this chapter and for losses 
incurred by borrowers.219
B.The First Case: Hilleshiem v. Source Lending 
  This bond is important, because often 
the mortgage broker either goes out of business prior to bringing a 
lawsuit or declares bankruptcy after a judgment is entered by the 
court.   
Although the 2007 Minnesota Anti-Predatory Lending Law 
originally passed in the spring of 2007, the new provisions did not 
come into effect until August 1, 2007.220  On April 3, 2008, 
approximately eight months after the law took effect, the first 
lawsuit claiming a violation of the new laws was filed by the Housing 
Preservation Project, a non-profit law firm in Saint Paul, 
Minnesota.221  The plaintiffs were an elderly couple, William 
Hilleshiem and Judy Hilleshiem, who had lived on their small farm 
for forty-one years.222
 
 216. Id. § 58.161, subdiv. 1(5). 
  The following section summarizes the 
 217. MINN. STAT. § 58.01 (2008). 
 218. Id.; See also discussion of Anti-Predatory Lending Law infra pt.III, subsec. A  
 219. MINN. STAT. § 58.06, subdiv. 2(b)(2) (2008). 
 220. MINN. STAT. § 58.13 (2006); 2007 Minn. Sess. Laws. Serv. ch. 74, 988 
(West). 
 221. Jessica Mador, Minnesota Public Radio, Elderly Couple Files First Lawsuit 
Under New Anti-Predatory Lending Law, Apr. 4, 2008, http://minnesota
.publicradio.org/display/web/2008/04/03/antipredatory.  (“Last year, state 
lawmakers passed a new consumer protection law designed to prevent mortgage 
lenders from overcharging borrowers.  Now an elderly couple from Red Wing has 
filed what appears to be the first lawsuit under Minnesota’s Anti-Predatory 
Lending law.”) (last visited Aug. 17, 2009). 
 222. First Am. Compl. 1, Hillesheim v. Source Lending Corp., Civil File No. 27-
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allegations made in the Plaintiffs’ Complaint. 
1. Background 
In spring 2007, Mr. and Mrs. Hilleshiem received a phone call 
from the defendant, Source Lending.223  Source Lending stated 
that it was interested in helping them refinance their home.224 At 
the time, Mr. and Mrs. Hilleshiem were living on a very tight 
budget.225  They had to pay approximately $898 per month for their 
existing mortgage, and then pay other bills for food, 
transportation, health care, and utilities using primarily Social 
Security benefits.226  Their existing mortgage had an adjustable 
interest rate, and they wanted to refinance and have a fixed interest 
rate.227
Source Lending promised that it could arrange for a fixed 
interest rate with a monthly payment of approximately $500 per 
month, and they arranged for a mortgage broker to come to their 
home to provide more details.
   
228  About a week later, a mortgage 
broker named David Kuntz came to their home and told them 
about Source Lending’s plan.229
Specifically, Kuntz said that Mr. and Mrs. Hilleshiem would not 
immediately qualify for the fixed interest rate mortgage with a 
monthly payment of approximately $500 per month.
   
230  Source 
Lending, however, could obtain the fixed interest rate mortgage 
with a monthly payment of approximately $500 per month, if they 
agreed to refinance twice.231
Kuntz explained that Mr. and Mrs. Hilleshiem would have to 
refinance twice because of their poor credit.
 
232  Source Lending 
would help them improve their credit score by first obtaining an 
ARM.233
 
CV-08-7612 (June 16, 2008).  
  After making two or three payments, Mr. and Mrs. 
Hilleshiem’s credit score would be improved enough to refinance, 
 223. Id. at 8. 
 224. Id. at 9. 
 225. Id. at 10. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. at 11. 
 228. Id. at 12. 
 229. Id. at 13. 
 230. Id. at 14. 
 231. Id. 
 232. Id. at 15. 
 233. Id.   
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again, into a fixed-rate mortgage.234  Source Lending further told 
the plaintiffs that they would pay no closing costs for refinancing 
the second time.235
In reliance on Source Lending’s representations, Mr. and Mrs. 
Hilleshiem decided to refinance their existing mortgage.
 
236 On 
June 11, 2007, Source Lending’s Dave Kuntz and another person 
came to the plaintiffs’ home to sign the various mortgage 
documents.237  The June 11, 2007 mortgage loan refinanced the 
plaintiffs’ existing mortgage loan, paying-off their balance of 
$127,590.78 and replaced it with a new mortgage with a principal 
balance of $153,750.238  According to the U.S. Department of 
Housing & Urban Development Settlement Statement Form 
(HUD-1), the settlement charges were over $7,000.239
Specifically, the defendant charged the plaintiffs $400 for an 
appraisal, even though Mr. and Mrs. Hilleshiem have no memory 
of any appraiser entering their home or coming to their property 
to conduct an appraisal.
  
240  They directly paid Source Lending 
nearly $4,000 in fees for origination, processing, underwriting, 
application, and administration.241  Source Lending was also paid a 
$2,882.81 yield spread premium from the lender, meaning that the 
interest rate was nearly two points higher than the interest rate that 
they had actually qualified for.242  The plaintiffs also paid $175 for a 
notary, and whopping $1,175 for title insurance, which is 
approximately three to four times higher than the reasonable 
market-rate for title insurance.243
As instructed, Mr. and Mrs. Hilleshiem made two monthly 
payments of approximately $1,320 for the June 11, 2007 mortgage 





 234. Id. 
  On October 26, 2007, Source Lending arranged for a 
closing company to come to Mr. and Mrs. Hilleshiem’s house to 
 235. Id. at 17. 
 236. Id. at 18. 
 237. Id. at 19. 
 238. Id. at 20. 
 239. Id. 
 240. Id. at 21. 
 241. Id. 
 242. Id. 
 243. Id. 
 244. Id. at 22. 
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sign the various mortgage documents for their second loan.245
The second loan paid-off the June mortgage loan of 
$156,781.41, and then created a new mortgage loan with the 
principal balance of $167,250.
  
246  Contrary to Source Lending’s 
statements, the monthly payment for the new mortgage loan would 
not be $500 per month.247  Instead, the monthly payment would be 
$1,300 (only about $20 less than the June 11, 2007 mortgage 
loan).248  Thus, the amount owed on Mr. and Mrs. Hilleshiem’s 
home went up approximately $40,000 in six months and their 
payments increased 30%.249
Much to Mr. and Mrs. Hilleshiem’s surprise, there were also 
thousands of dollars of closing costs for the October 26, 2007 
mortgage loan.
 
250  Mr. and Mrs. Hilleshiem were charged another 
$200 for an appraisal—even though they had purportedly just had 
an appraisal four months ago—and, they were charged an 
“external” appraisal review fee of $140 and an “internal” appraisal 
review fee of $95.251  Source Lending also charged Mr. and Mrs. 
Hilleshiem over $5,000 in additional fees.252  Source Lending also 
received another yield spread premium from the lender in the 
amount of $3,972.19, meaning that Mr. and Mrs. Hilleshiem 
received an interest rate approximately two points higher than the 
interest rate that they had qualified to receive.253  They were also 
charged $1,175 for title insurance, again.254
2. Legal Claims Asserted by Mr. and Mrs. Hilleshiem Against 
Source Lending 
 
The lawsuit had a total of seven counts, three of which were 
against Source Lending and asserted violations of the 2007 Anti-
Predatory Lending Law.255
 
 245. Id. at 28. 
  Count I alleged a violation of Minnesota 
Statutes section 58.137, subdivision 1, originating a mortgage loan 
with points and fees in excess of 5% of the loan, which includes the 
 246. Id. at 29. 
 247. Id. at 30. 
 248. Id.  
 249. Id. 
 250. Id. at 31. 
 251. Id. at 32. 
 252. Id. at 33. 
 253. Id. 
 254. Id. at 34. 
 255. See Id. 
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yield spread premium received by Source Lending.256  Count II 
alleged that Source Lending failed to verify Mr. and Mrs. 
Hilleshiem’s ability to pay the mortgage loan.257  Mr. and Mrs. 
Hilleshiem’s monthly mortgage payment was approximately 80% of 
their monthly income, consisting of a Social Security check and a 
small pension.  Count III alleged that Source Lending was liable for 
violating the Anti-Predatory Lending Law for “churning” Mr. and 
Mrs. Hilleshiem.258  Specifically, given Mr. and Mrs. Hilleshiem’s 
age, income, liabilities, and the mere $20 to $30 difference 
between the monthly payments of the new and refinanced 
mortgage, the new mortgage did not provide a tangible net benefit 
to them.259
3. The Pressure Increases on Source Lending 
 
Later, the Minnesota Attorney General filed a four-count 
complaint against Source Lending alleging a pattern of illegal 
conduct similar to the allegations made in Mr. and Mrs. 
Hilleshiem’s complaint.260
Source Lending sold risky and complex loans to 
Minnesota consumers, including “Hybrid ARMs” and “Pay 
Option ARMs,” by employing a multitude of false, 
misleading, and deceptive acts and practices.  These 
unlawful acts and practices include misleading consumers 
about the terms of the loans; using the classic “bait-and-
switch” technique; and making false promises of serial 
refinancing.
  Specifically, the Minnesota Attorney 
General stated that: 
261
The Attorney General’s Complaint alleges that Source 
Lending routinely represented in direct mail and on its website 
that people can save $200 or more on their monthly mortgage 




 256. Id. at 37–42. 
  This is 
consistent with Mr. and Mrs. Hilleshiem’s claim that Source 
Lending represented to her that her monthly mortgage payment 
 257. Id. at 43–46. 
 258. Id. at 47–50. 
 259. Id. at 50. 
 260. Compare Complaint, Minnesota v. Source Lending Corp., No. 27-CV-08-
19803 (Minn. Dist. Ct. filed August 14, 2008), with First Amended Complaint, 
supra note 222. 
 261. Id. at 1. 
 262. Id. at 13. 
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would drop from approximately $800  to $500. 
The Attorney General’s Complaint also states that Source 
Lending routinely baited consumers into refinancing, and then 
switched to another loan on “the eve of closing or at the closing.”263
4. Toward Resolution 
  
This is also what Mr. and Mrs. Hilleshiem allege happened to them. 
On July 11, 2008, Source Lending offered a “Confession of 
Judgment” in the amount of $11,187 related to Count I of Mr. and 
Mrs. Hilleshiem’s Complaint.264  The Confession of Judgment was 
offered pursuant to Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 68.01(c), 
and did not include attorneys’ fees and costs.265  Within the 
applicable time period, Mr. and Mrs. Hilleshiem accepted the 
Confession of Judgment, and then moved the court to immediately 
award attorney’s fees and order that the $11,187 either be paid or 
placed in escrow for the benefit of Mr. and Mrs. Hilleshiem.266
That suspicion was confirmed when Source Lending’s counsel 
withdrew, and the company defaulted on the remainder of Mr. and 
Mrs. Hilleshiem’s claims.  Luckily, due to the new Minnesota Anti-
Predatory Lending Law, there was a bond in place to protect Mr. 
and Mrs. Hilleshiem.  Judgment was entered against Source 
Lending for well over the $50,000 bond amount, and Mr. and Mrs. 
Hilleshiem proceeded to collect this judgment against the bond.
  
Because of the Attorney General’s lawsuit and the failure of Source 
Lending to pay its newspaper advertising bills, Mr. and Mrs. 
Hilleshiem were concerned that Source Lending was going out of 
business.   
267
IV. THE MINNESOTA ANTI-PREDATORY LENDING LAW AS A NATIONAL 
MODEL 
  
The strength of Minnesota’s Anti-Predatory Lending Law is the 
balance it strikes between specific prohibitions, such as a clear cap 
 
 263. Id. at 43. 
 264. Rule 68.01 Offer of Judgment as to Count 1 of Plaintiff’s First Amended 
Complaint, Hilleshiem, No. 27-CV-08-7612.  
 265. See Id. 
 266. Acceptance of Rule 68.01 Offer of Judgment, Hilleshiem, No. 27-CV-08-
7612. 
 267. See Order Granting Summary Judgment and the Award of Reasonable 
Attorney Fees and Costs, Hilleshiem, No. 27-CV-08-7612.   
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on financed charges, and general provisions that will apply to the 
new predatory lending schemes in the future.  It is similar to the 
structure and approach of the federal Fair Debt Collection 
Practices Act (FDCPA).268  The FDCPA has specific prohibitions, 
such as prohibiting communication once a written request is made 
or “depositing or threatening to deposit any postdated check or 
other postdated payment instrument prior to the date on such 
check or instrument.”269  The FDCPA also has general prohibitions 
on actions that harass, oppress, or abuse debtors.270
Specific provisions allow the consumer to obtain immediate 
relief through litigation.  In Hilleshiem, the homeowner received a 
Confession of Judgment just six months after filing the lawsuit.  But 
the broader, more general duties of agency created an opportunity 
to recover far more damages.  A duty of agency between a 
Minnesota borrower and the mortgage broker is also flexible, and 
has the ability to adapt to emerging schemes that are not presently 
known.  A duty of agency is also consistent with how ordinary 
borrowers already view their relationship with their mortgage 
broker.  It should be a uniform, national policy. 
  The general 
and specific aspects of the Minnesota Anti-Predatory Lending Law 
are the approach that should be adopted as a model at the federal 
level.  General and specific provisions complement one another, 
and they often, in practice, hasten a resolution to the larger action 
by creating clear liability related to one part.   
Some of these concepts are part of the Mortgage Reform and 
Anti-Predatory Lending Act that passed the United States House of 
Representatives on May 7, 2009.271  For example, it requires that the 
loan have a tangible net benefit for the borrower and that the 
borrower have the ability to pay.272  It also prohibits yield spread 
premiums paid outside of closing from a lender to a mortgage 
broker as a reward for facilitating a loan with a higher interest rate 
than the borrower otherwise qualified for.273
The bill, however, does not create a legally enforceable agency 
relationship between a mortgage broker and the borrower.  That is 
   
 
 268. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692 (2006). 
 269. 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(c); 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(4). 
 270. 15 U.S.C. § 1692d. 
 271. See Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act, H.R. 1728, 111th 
Cong. (2009).  
 272. Id. 
 273. Id. 
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short-sighted, and it is a mistake.  This agency relationship would 
help ensure that the signaling, sorting, and guarantees discussed in 
Part II are effective and have a positive effect on the transaction 
and the overall market.  Additionally, a national law that creates 
this legally enforceable relationship can uniformly apply to all 
entities, because pre-emption is obviously not an issue with federal 
statutes.  If regulation is simply focused or limited to 
“independent” mortgage brokers, lenders will just use brokers or 
loan officers that are actually bank employees to avoid the 
regulations and continue predatory practices. 
The other lesson learned from the Hilleshiem litigation is that 
predatory lending and damages from predatory lending are 
significant.  Although Mr. and Mrs. Hilleshiem were able to recover 
damages from Source Lending’s bond, they did not collect their 
full judgment and the bond is now gone.  For the second, third, or 
fourth victim of Source Lending’s predatory practices, there is no 
bond and there will likely be no recovery.  The only thing that 
these victims will collect is an empty and uncollectable judgment 
against a defunct corporation. 
As evidenced by the numerous individuals cited in the 
Attorney General’s Complaint, Source Lending’s illegal practices 
were pervasive and widespread.  Assuming that there are merely 
fifty more victims (which is an unreasonably low estimate) that each 
had just $15,000 in damages (which is also an unreasonably low 
estimate), the total amount of claims would be $750,000.  This 
illustrates that the statutorily proscribed $50,000 bond is 
insufficient to compensate the victims of predatory mortgage 
brokers.  Either the bond requirement needs to be increased or 
there needs to be an alternative system, or both.  
Similarly, at a federal level, enactment of any new rights for 
borrowers or homeowners must recognize that this is a billion 
dollar industry and also that many of the actors appear and 
disappear.  It is estimated that there will be approximately three 
hundred bank failures as a result of the current economic crisis.274  
The number of mortgage brokers that have shut down is even more 
striking.  For example, in Massachusetts there has been an 80% 
decrease in the number of mortgage brokers.275
 
 274. Alistair Barr, Bank Failures to Surge in Coming Years, MARKETWATCH, May 
23, 2008, http://www.marketwatch.com/story/bank-failures-surge-credit-crunch. 
  To the extent that 
 275. Eric Convey, Mortgage Misery: After Months of Decline, Broker Ranks Seen 
Falling by 80 Percent from Peak, BOSTON BUS. J., June 6, 2008, available at 
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Congress uses the Minnesota Anti-Predatory Lending Law as a 
model, Congress must ensure that homeowners are financially 
protected from under-capitalized and bankrupt companies. 
In conclusion, reform of the day-to-day regulation of lending 
must take into account the irrationality, emotion, and, sometimes, 
exploitation that occurs in a continuing or on-going business 
relationships.  The foreclosure and economic crisis highlights what 
happens when such issues are not taken into account and the 
community assumes that markets behave rationally and there is no 
need for government regulation.  The Minnesota Model provides a 
framework for national regulation of predatory lending practices.  
It sets clear standards of conduct to eliminate the most egregious 
behavior, but also includes broader more flexible standards to 
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